This paper introduces a model where agents are unsure about the central bank's inflation target. They believe that the central bank's inflation target could lie between two extremes, and their beliefs vary depending on the central bank's stock of credibility. They form the expectations used in price and wage setting using this perceived inflation target, and they use past observations of inflation to update their beliefs about the credibility of the central bank. Thus a series of high inflation observations can lead them to believe (incorrectly) that the central bank has adopted a high target. High inflation expectations are incorporated into price and wage setting decisions, and a transitory shock to inflation can become very persistent. The model with endogenous credibility can match the volatility and persistence of both inflation and measures of long-term inflation expectations that we see in the data. The model is then calibrated to match the observed levels of Federal Reserve credibility in the 1980's and the 2000's. By simply changing the level of credibility, holding all else fixed, the model can explain nearly all of the observed changes in the volatility and persistence of inflation and inflation expectations in the U.S. from the 1980's to today.
Introduction
Milton Friedman said that "In ‡ation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (1968) . Friedman was careful to qualify that in ‡ation is a "steady and sustained rise in prices", for while a number of factors can lead to a transitory movement in prices in the short run, only monetary policy can cause a sustained rise in the price level over the medium to long run. So while movements in current in ‡ation or even the agents' expectation of in ‡ation over the next year could be driven by a number of factors unrelated to monetary policy, their expectation of in ‡ation over the long run should be entirely driven by their perception of monetary policy.
The bene…t of setting a credible in ‡ation target is that it anchors long-run in ‡ation expectations (Bernanke, Laubach, and Mishkin, 2001) . If the central bank announces that it will keep in ‡ation at x% over the medium to long run, and agents believe them, then long-run in ‡ation expectations should be x%. Even without a formal in ‡ation target the central bank can still communicate to the public its desired in ‡ation rate over the long run and if the central bank is credible, then long-run in ‡ation expectations should be …xed at the announced rate. Most developed country central banks express their desire for low and stable in ‡ation, but comparing the evidence both across time and across countries shows that their record in anchoring long-run in ‡ation expectations is mixed. Williams (2006) and Stock and Watson (2007) …nd that U.S. in ‡ation is less responsive to its own lags now than in the 1970s. They argue this is because in ‡ation expectations are better anchored now than they were in the 1970's, and thus transitory ‡uctuations in in ‡ation do not a¤ect in ‡ation expectations. Similarly, Blanchard and Gali (2007) , Blanchard and Riggi (2009) , and Evans and Fisher (2011) argue that the reason that oil price shocks in the 1970's had a large e¤ect on in ‡ation but that shocks of similar magnitude in the 2000's did not is because improved central bank credibility which has served to better anchor in ‡ation expectations. Leduc, Sill, and Stark (2007) , Mehra and Herrington (2008) , and Clark and Davig (2011) …nd that U.S. in ‡ation expectations are much less volatile and much less responsive to macroeconomic news and commodity prices now than they were in the 1970's. Goodfriend and King (2005) examine public statements by Federal Reserve policy makers and the transcripts of FOMC meetings during the Volcker disin ‡ation in the early 1980's and show that the Fed saw regaining credibility as the key step towards anchoring in ‡ation expectations. Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) …nd that in the U.S., long-run in ‡ation expectations, proxied by far forward Treasury yields, respond to macroeconomic news. Long-forward rates, which they argue are mainly composed of in ‡ation expectations, should not respond to macroeconomic news if long-run in ‡ation expectations are truly anchored. Gurkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2006) do a similar exercise but compare the response of far forward rates in the U.S., the UK, and Sweden to macroeconomic news. They …nd that far forward rates respond very little to news in in ‡ation targeting Sweden and respond the most in the U.S. Their sample contains data from the UK from both before and after the independence of the Bank of England. They …nd that far forward rates from pre-independence UK behave more like those from the U.S., but far forward rates from post-independence UK behave more like Sweden. Similarly Beechey, Johannsen, and Levin (2011) use far forward in ‡ation expectations derived from in ‡ation swaps and …nd that far forward in ‡ation expectations in the U.S. are more sensitive to current macroeconomic news than far forward expectations in a number of European countries.
Since in ‡ation expectations are incorporated into wage and price setting, which then a¤ect the price level in the future, the unanchoring of in ‡ation expectations is closely related to the persistence of in ‡ation. Benati (2008) estimates in ‡ation persistence in many di¤erent countries across many di¤erent monetary regimes. He …nds that in ‡ation persistence was near zero in many of the countries on the gold standard, while he cannot reject the hypothesis that in many developed countries in ‡ation followed a random walk throughout much of the post-WW2 period. He …nds that in the post-Volcker United States, in ‡ation does not follow a random walk but the persistence parameter is still positive and signi…cant, while persistence is near zero in many in ‡ation targeting countries.
The standard New Keynesian model with rational expectations cannot reproduce the high persistence in in ‡ation that has been observed in the data (and as a corollary to this persistence, the high volatility of long-run in ‡ation expectations). Authors usually include rule-of-thumb pricing behavior, as in Gali and Gertler (1999) , or price indexation, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) , to introduce what Fuhrer (2006; refers to as "intrinsic" in ‡ation persistence.
1 Hornstein (2007) …nds that the usual New Keynesian model cannot explain the fact that both the level and persistence of in ‡ation rose during the 1970's and then came back down. He concludes that the only way to model this in the standard New Keynesian model is to introduce variable trend in ‡ation and a degree of indexation that varies positively with the level of trend in ‡ation.
Given that the standard New Keynesian model cannot replicate the persistence of in ‡a-tion or the volatility of long-run in ‡ation expectations without adding questionable structural parameters like price indexation, a number of authors have proposed modi…cations of this model. Cogley and Sbordone (2008) estimate a model with a role for both variable trend in ‡ation and price indexation. They …nd that variable trend in ‡ation is responsible for the persistence of in ‡ation in the data, and after accounting for variable trend in ‡ation, price indexation is unimportant.
2 Similarly, Ireland (2007) estimates a model that allows for variable trend in ‡ation and …nds that the Fed's in ‡ation target was low during the 1950's, rose throughout the 60's and 70's, and since then has fallen back to pre-1970's levels. Recently, some authors have modi…ed the standard New Keynesian model to say that agents don't have complete information about the central bank's in ‡ation target, and must learn this from observations of past in ‡ation. Milani (2007) incorporates "learning" into the standard New Keynesian model, estimates the model, and …nds that when learning is included, you do not need to incorporate features like price indexation or habit formation in consumption to get the persistence of macroeconomic variables. Similarly, Lansing (2009) constructs a model where agents use a Kalman …lter approach to deduce whether a shock to the policy function is permanent or transitory, and he shows that this model can reproduce the observed time-varying persistence and volatility of both in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations in the U.S. Andolfatto and Gomme (2003) and Erceg and Levin (2003) construct models where agents are unsure about either the money growth rule or the central bank's in ‡ation target, and must infer the target from past observations of in ‡ation. They show how this learning is necessary to explain the large output loss that accompanies a transition from a high in ‡ation regime (high money growth rule or high in ‡ation target) to a low in ‡ation regime (low money growth rate or low in ‡ation target). Similarly Schorfheide (2005) and Del Negro and Eusepi (2012) estimate a DSGE model with either complete information or a role for learning and …nds that the model with complete information does well in explaining most of the historical experience in the U.S., but the model with learning is necessary to explain the Volcker disin ‡ation of the early 1980's. In testing for the rationality of in ‡ation expectations, Andolfatto, Hendry, and Moran (2008) show that in a learning model, perfectly rational agents can consistently report biased in ‡ation expectations following a central bank regime change.
The goal of this paper is to merge the results from the empirical literature that …nds signi…cant cross-country and cross-time di¤erences in the persistence and volatility of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations with the mechanics of the learning literature. Unlike the learning literature, where agents observe a change in the central bank's policy rate or the money growth rate, and then use a Kalman …lter technique to infer whether or not the "shock" was permanent or transitory, in this model, agents believe the central bank's in ‡ation target could vary between a high target and a low target. Agents'beliefs about the central bank's in ‡ation target are based on a weighted average of this high and low target, where the weight they place on the low target is referred to as the central bank's stock of credibility. Agents use past observations of in ‡ation to update this stock of credibility, and thus their belief about the central bank's target.
3 A string of high in ‡ation realizations can shift agent's beliefs about the in ‡ation target, and they will place more weight on the high target. This high expected in ‡ation will be incorporated into price and wage setting decisions, and thus a string of high in ‡ation observations can lead to high in ‡ation expectations, which become self-ful…lling.
4
Throughout this paper we will refer to the model where agents form expectations about the future based on a weighted average of two scenarios, and the weight is endogenous, as the endogenous credibility model. This paper will show that a New Keynesian model with endogenous credibility preforms much better than the benchmark model in its ability to explain the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations that we observe in the data. We then compare the results from model with endogenous credibility to the benchmark New Keynesian model with either price and wage indexation or near permanent shocks, which are two features that researchers use to add in ‡ation persistence to the benchmark New Keynesian model. The models with indexation or with permanent shocks do just as well as the model with endogenous credibility in matching the persistence in current in ‡ation and the dynamics of short-run in ‡ation expectations, but these two models preform rather poorly in explaining the behavior of long-run in ‡ation expectations. Only the model with endogenous credibility can match the volatility and co-movement of long-run measures of in ‡ation expectations. We then calibrate the model to match the observed levels of Federal Reserve credibility in the 1980's and the 2000's. We show that by simply changing the level of central bank credibility, holding all else …xed, the model can explain nearly all of the observed changes in the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations in the U.S. from the 1980's to today. This paper will proceed as follows. Some statistics describing the behavior of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations in both the U.S. and the UK are presented in section 2. Here we pay particular attention to how the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation and expectations have changed over time, we compare the statistics from the U.S. in the 1980's to the statistics from the U.S. today and the statistics from the UK pre-1997 to those from the UK post-1997. The theoretical model is described in section 3. Basically the model is the benchmark New Keynesian model described in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) , but expectations are formed using this concept of endogenous credibility. The calibration of the model is discussed in section 4. Here special attention is paid to exactly how to calibrate the model to re ‡ect historical observations of central bank credibility and the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations. The results from the model are presented in section 5. Here we will examine both impulse responses and simulated moments from the model to see how the model with endogenous credibility preforms much better than the model with rational expectations in matching the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations, especially the behavior of long-run in ‡ation expectations. Finally section 6 concludes with some directions for further research.
Volatility and Persistence of In ‡ation Expectations
In this section, we'll present some descriptive statistics related to the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations. In order to appreciate how these statistics can vary, we'll look at these statistics in both the U.S. and the UK across multiple time periods.
For in ‡ation expectations, we will consider measures of both short-run in ‡ation expectations and long-run in ‡ation expectations. The three measures we consider are: the expected change in the price level over the next year (one year ahead in ‡ation expectations, E t ( t+1 )), the expected change in the price level over the next ten years (10 year ahead in ‡ation expectations, E t 1 10 10 P i=1 t+i ), and the expected change in the price level over a period beginning …ve years from now and ending ten years from now (5 year -5 year forward in ‡ation expectations, E t 1 5 10 P i=6 t+i ). Table 1 presents some evidence about the cross-time evolution of the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations in the U.S. and the UK. In the table, U.S. in ‡ation is de…ned as the year-over-year percentage change consumer price index (CPI), and in ‡ation expectations are taken from the dataset compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and described in Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken (2011) . This dataset contains measures of n year ahead in ‡ation expectations for the U.S. for n = 1:::30. Expectations are observed monthly from January 1982 to the present. To produce the descriptive statistics in table 1 we use the Cleveland Fed's measures of 1 year ahead expectations, 5 year ahead expectations, and 10 year ahead expectations.
5 UK in ‡ation is de…ned as the year-over-year percentage change in the UK retail price index, and expectations are taken from the di¤er-ence between 5 and 10 year real and nominal UK government bonds and are published at monthly frequency starting in 1985 by the Bank of England.
In table 1 the sample for the U.S. is split into an early sample, from 1982 to 1989, and a later sample, from 2000 to 2007. The data from the UK is split into the 1985-1996 sample and the 1997-2007 sample. The …rst thing to notice is that in both the U.S. and the UK, the volatility of in ‡ation fell dramatically between the early sample and the later sample. In the U.S., the volatility of 1 year ahead in ‡ation expectations proportionally fell in line with the fall in in ‡ation volatility, in both the 80's and in the 00's, 1 year ahead in ‡ation expectations is about half as volatile as in ‡ation. In the U.S., the volatility of long-run in ‡ation expectations actually fell by more than the fall in in ‡ation volatility. Both 10 year ahead in ‡ation expectations and 5 year-5 year forward expectations went from being about half as volatile as in ‡ation to about a third as volatile. In the UK, the volatility of long-run in ‡ation expectations fell from the later period to the earlier period, but they fell in line with the drop in in ‡ation volatility, and the 10 year ahead expectations and the 5 year-5 year forward expectations are around 40% as volatile as in ‡ation in both the earlier and later periods.
In both the U.S. and the UK, there is a sharp reduction in the correlations between current in ‡ation and future in ‡ation expectations between the earlier and the later time periods. In the U.S. in the 1980's, the correlation between current in ‡ation and year ahead in ‡ation expectations was over 0:7, while the correlations between current in ‡ation and longrun measures of expectations were greater than 0:5. In the 2000's, the correlation between current in ‡ation and 1 year ahead expectations drops to about 0:4, and the correlations between current in ‡ation and longer term measures of expectations drop even more. The correlation between current in ‡ation and 10 year ahead expectations falls to about 0:25, and the correlation with 5 year-5 year forward expectations drops below 0:2. Similarly the statistics for the UK show that the long-run in ‡ation expectations were highly correlated with current in ‡ation in the period before the Bank of England's independence with correlation coe¢ cients around 0:6 to 0:7, but in the period after independence, long-run in ‡ation expectations are largely uncorrelated with current in ‡ation, with correlation coe¢ cients only about 0:2 to 0:3. Table 2 also presents some evidence about the cross-time evolution of the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations in the U.S. and the UK, but this time the expected in ‡ation data is taken from 1, 5 and 10 year in ‡ation swaps. Since the data is taken from in ‡ation swaps, the sample begins in July 2004. The …rst column for each country corresponds to the data from July 2004 to December 2007 and the second column corresponds to the data from January 2008 to November 2011. Thus the data is split into pre-crisis and crisis/post-crisis samples. The …rst and most obvious di¤erence between the two samples is that in ‡ation volatility tripled in both the U.S. and the UK in the crisis sample, and the volatility of 1 year-ahead in ‡ation expectations nearly quadrupled in the U.S. and increased by a factor of six in the UK during the crisis.
However, the recent crisis had much less of an e¤ect on the volatility of measures of long-run in ‡ation expectations, especially those in the UK. In the U.S. the volatility of 10 year-ahead in ‡ation expectation nearly tripled between the pre-crisis and crisis periods, but they only increased by about 75% in the UK. Similarly, the volatility of the 5 year -5 year forward expectation increased by about 75% in the U.S. but only around 40% in the UK.
The correlation between the various measures of in ‡ation expectations and current in ‡a-tion explains why the volatility of short-run in ‡ation expectations increased alongside actual in ‡ation during the crisis but the volatility of long-run expectations, particularly those in the UK, did not. In both the U.S. and the UK, the correlation between current in ‡ation and year ahead in ‡ation expectations is nearly the same in both the pre-crisis and the crisis samples. In the U.S., the correlation between current in ‡ation and 10 year ahead expectations is largely unchanged in the two samples, but in the UK, the correlation between current in ‡ation and 10 year ahead expectations is 0:75 prior to 2008, but the correlation nearly drops to zero in the post-2008 data. Similarly, the correlation between current in ‡ation and 5 year-5 year forward expectations changes from positive to negative between the two sample periods in both the U.S. and the UK. In the UK, the correlation between the two is greater than 0:7 prior to 2008 but less than 0:6 after 2008.
The Model
The model with endogenous central bank credibility is nearly identical to the model in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) . There are monopolistically competitive intermediate goods …rms that produce a di¤erentiated product that is then aggregated into a …nal good used for consumption, investment and government purchases. There are also households that supply a di¤erentiated type of labor. In the model, Calvo (1983) pricing in both the intermediate goods sector and the household sector gives rise to nominal wage and price rigidities.
Due to these wage and price rigidities, a …rm or a household knows that if given the opportunity to change their price today, their new nominal price will most likely be in place for at least a few periods into the future. Thus when setting an optimal price or wage, price setters have to take into account not only current conditions, but the expectation of future conditions. In the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) model, the expectation of future variables is determined using rational expectations. We abstract from that here. Instead we assume that agents are unsure about the central bank's in ‡ation target. They believe the target could vary between two extremes, and agents'belief about the target is determined by the central bank's stock of credibility. Every period agents update their belief about the central bank's credibility using past observations of in ‡ation. Thus agents will lower their beliefs about the central bank's credibility following a series of high in ‡ation observations, and they will revise upward their beliefs about the central bank's in ‡ation target. If agents form expectations expecting high in ‡ation, then these high expectations get incorporated into the price and wage setting decisions, leading to higher in ‡ation.
Production
Final goods, used for private consumption, government consumption, and investment are formed through a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
where y t (i) is the quantity produced by …rm i, and is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods from di¤erent …rms. When considering the results from simulations of the model, in one set of simulations we will simulate the model under stochastic government spending shocks. There will be more about the calibration of the exogenous process for G t in section 4, but the steady state value of G t is set such that in the steady state, government spending is 20% of GDP ,
From the aggregator function in (1), the demand for the intermediate good from …rm i is:
where P t (i) is the price set by …rm i, and
The …rm produces …nished goods by combining capital and labor in the following CobbDouglas production technology:
where h t (i) and k t (i) are the labor and capital employed by the …rm in period t, is a small …xed cost term that is calibrated to ensure that …rms earn zero pro…t in the steady state, and A t is a stochastic productivity parameter common to all …rms. From the …rm's cost minimization problem, the demand from …rm i for labor and capital is given by:
where W t is the wage rate, R t is the capital rental rate and
Price setting by intermediate goods …rms In period t, the …rm will be able to change its price with probability 1 p . If the …rm cannot change prices then they are reset automatically according to P t (i) = I t 1 P t 1 (i), where I t 1 = ss , the steady state gross in ‡ation rate. In an alternative version of the model we will consider the case where prices are indexed to the previous period's in ‡ation rate,
Thus if allowed to change their price in period t, the …rm will set a price to maximize:
where t is the marginal utility of income in period t and
t;t+ 1 if > 0 As discussed in this paper's technical appendix, the …rm that is able to change its price in period t will set its price to:
If prices are ‡exible, and thus p = 0, then this expression reduces to:
which says that the …rm will set a price equal to a constant mark-up over marginal cost.
Notice that the optimal price P t (i) does not involve the usual rational expectations operator, E t ( ), but a modi…ed operatorẼ t ( ).
Instead of assuming, as in most rational expectations models, that private agents know the central bank's in ‡ation target with certainty, assume that agents are unsure about the in ‡ation target. Speci…cally, they believe the target could vary anywhere between a low target, L , or a high target, H .
Agents know the distribution of actual in ‡ation around the two targets. Figure 1 shows the distribution of actual in ‡ation around the target value L = 0% or around the target value H = 10%. Thus they believe that the central bank has an in ‡ation target~ , where:
Let t be the set of information about the structure of the economy, all parameters (other than the in ‡ation target), and the sequence of shocks to a¤ect the economy up to an including shocks in period t, then for any variable x t+i for all i = 1:::1 in the model:
and for notational simplicity de…neẼ t (x t+i ) Ẽ (x t+i j t ; c t ). The central bank's stock of credibility, c t , is a function of previous in ‡ation rates, speci…cally suppose that the observed value of in ‡ation in period t 1 is , then agents will update their perception of the central bank's credibility according to:
where P t 1 = j L is the probability that in ‡ation in period t 1 would be given that the central bank is targeting the low in ‡ation rate, P t 1 = j H is the probability of the same event given that the central bank is targeting a high in ‡ation rate, c is the steady state level of the central bank's credibility, and is a parameter that measures how responsive is the central bank's credibility to past realizations of in ‡ation. Thus determines how well anchored are in ‡ation expectations. In this updating function, this model is very similar to Barro (1986) where agents are unsure whether or not the central banker can commit, and thus use past observations of in ‡ation to update their beliefs about the central banker's type, and thus their expectations How the observed value of in ‡ation in t 1 a¤ects the central bank's credibility is illustrated by the example in …gure 1. The …gure shows two distributions of in ‡ation around the target values L = 0% and H = 10%. Suppose that the rate of in ‡ation in period t 1 was 6%, as shown by the vertical line. Agents will see that a 6% in ‡ation rate is more likely under H = 10% than L = 0%, and thus the central bank's credibility would fall,
Write the price set by the …rm that can reset prices in period t as P t (i) to denote it as an optimal price. Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same level, so P t (i) = P t . Substitute this optimal price into the price index
Since a …rm has a probability of 1 p of being able to change their price, then by the law of large numbers in any period 1 p percent of …rms will reoptimize prices. Thus the price index, P t , can be written as: 6 Since in ‡ation follows a continuous distribution around
, which leads to a 0 0 in equation (6). If however we assume that in ‡ation approximately follows a normal distribution around
, where is the c.d.f. of the normal distribution, and by l'Hospital's rule this equals
, where is the p.d.f. of the normal distribution.
After combining the expression for the optimal price in (5) and the equation describing the evolution of the price index in (7), one can derive the usual New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) that relates in ‡ation this period to current marginal costs and the expected value of in ‡ation next period:
Notice in this Phillips curve the expectation of next period's in ‡ation is arrived at when agents are unsure about the central bank's target in ‡ation rate and central bank credibility is endogenous,Ẽ t (^ t+1 ). If instead agents had full information about the central bank's in ‡ation target then this NKPC simply condenses to its usual form where E t (^ t+1 ) replaces
In a later section we will compare the results of the model with incomplete information and endogenous central bank credibility to the model with full information and price indexation. As discussed earlier, full price indexation implies that …rms that cannot reset their price in period t simply scale up their existing price by the previous period's in ‡ation rate
From equation (9) it is easy to see how the price indexation introduces the lagged in ‡ation term^ t 1 into the Phillips curve and thus introduces persistence into the in ‡ation process. It is not as obvious, but the fact that the future in ‡ation term is denotedẼ t (^ t+1 ) instead of E t (^ t+1 ) also introduces the lagged in ‡ation rate and thus persistence into the Phillips curve under endogenous credibility in equation (8). Recall that the expectations operator in the model with endogenous credibility,Ẽ t ( ), depends on the central bank's stock of credibility c t . Recall from equation (6) that the formula to update the central bank's stock of credibility depends on the lagged in ‡ation rate, t 1 .
If c t depends on the lagged in ‡ation rate, thenẼ t (^ t+1 ) depends on the lagged in ‡ation rate, and thus the lagged in ‡ation rate is a part of the Phillips curve under endogenous central bank credibility. The e¤ect of the lagged in ‡ation rate on c t , and thusẼ t (^ t+1 ), is increasing in . If is positive but small the the lagged in ‡ation rate is part of the Phillips curve under endogenous credibility, but the e¤ect is small. If is close to one then the lagged in ‡ation rate has a much greater presence in the Phillips curve, and thus in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations are more volatile and persistent.
Households
Households, indexed l 2 [0 1], supply labor, own capital, and consume from their labor income, rental income, and interest on savings. Furthermore they pay lump sum taxes to the government to …nance government expenditures.
The household maximizes their utility function:
subject to their budget constraint:
where C t (l) is consumption by household l in period t, H t (l) is the household's labor e¤ort in the period, T t (l) = P t G t (l) are the lump sum taxes paid by the household to …nance government consumption, B t (l) is the household's stock of bonds at the beginning of the period 7 , W t (l) is the wage paid for the household's heterogenous labor supply, and K t (l) is the stock of capital owned by the household at the beginning of the period. The household's capital stock, K t (l), evolves according to the usual capital accumulation equation:
where market clearing in the market for physical capital requires that the sum of the physical capital stock across households is equal to the sum of physical capital demand across …rms,
Each household supplies a di¤erentiated type of labor. The function to aggregate the labor supplied by each household into the aggregate stock of labor employed by …rms is:
7 Market clearing in the bond market requires that the sum of bond holdings across all households equals zero,
where market clearing in the labor market requires that
Since the household supplies a di¤erentiated type of labor, it faces a downward sloping labor demand function:
Wage setting by households
In any given period, household l faces a probability of 1 w of being able to reset their wage. If the household cannot change its wage then it is reset automatically according to W t (l) = I t 1 W t 1 (l), where I t 1 = ss , the steady state gross in ‡ation rate. In an alternative version of the model we will consider the case where wages are indexed to the previous period's in ‡ation rate,
Assume that complete asset market exist that allow households to pool risk. The wage rate and the labor e¤ort will be di¤erent across households due to nominal wage rigidity, but all other variables that appear in the household budget constraint are equal across households. Thus all households have the same level of consumption, C t (l) = C t and the same marginal utility of consumption.
If household l is allowed to reset their wages in period t they will set a wage to maximize the expected present value of utility from consumption minus the disutility of labor.
Thus after technical details which are located in the appendix, the household that can reset wages in period t will choose a wage:
If wages are ‡exible, and thus w = 0, this expression reduces to:
Thus when wages are ‡exible the wage rate is equal to a mark-up, 1 , multiplied by the marginal disutility of labor,
H , divided by the marginal utility of consumption,
Notice again that when expectations of future variables are used to calculate the current optimal wage, agents use the modi…ed expectations operator,Ẽ t ( ), instead of the rational expectations operator, E t ( ). Write the wage rate for the household that can reset wages in period t, W t (l), as W t (l) to denote it as an optimal wage. Also note that all households that can reset wages in period t will reset to the same wage rate, so W t (l) = W t .
All households face a probability of (1 w ) of being able to reset their wages in a given period, so by the law of large numbers (1 w ) of households can reset their wages in a given period. Substitute W t into the expression for the aggregate wage rate
, to derive an expression for the evolution of the aggregate wage:
In the model with endogenous credibility, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve relating wage in ‡ation this period to expected future wage in ‡ation and the marginal disutility of labor this period is given by:
1. If wages that could not be changed in a given period were reset using the previous period's in ‡ation rate, but central bank credibility was …xed, then the New Keynesian Phillips curve would be:
Just as before in the Phillips curve with price in ‡ation, persistence is added to the model with indexation by the presence of the lagged in ‡ation rate in the Phillips curve equation. In the model with endogenous credibility, the lagged in ‡ation rate has an e¤ect on the stock of central bank credibility and thus onẼ t w t+1 . The full derivation of both Phillips curves is presented in the appendix.
Monetary Policy
The monetary policy instrument is the short-run risk free rate, i t , which is determined by the central bank's Taylor rule function:
whereŷ t = GDPt GDPt 1, where GDP t is the level of GDP at time t in an economy with the same structure as the one just described and subject to the same shocks, only there are no price or wage frictions, p = w = 0, and m t is an exogenous monetary policy shock. is the central bank's in ‡ation target, which is not known by the private agents in the economy, in order to ensure that private agents don't make systematic mistakes in predicting the long-run level of in ‡ation, = c L + (1 c) H .
Calibration

Parameter Values
The various parameters used in the model and their values are listed in table 3. The …rst …ve parameters, the discount factor, capital's share of income, the capital depreciation rate, the elasticity of substitution across varieties from di¤erent …rms, the elasticity of substitution between labor from di¤erent households, and are all set to values that are commonly found in the literature. The next two parameters are the Calvo wage and price stickiness parameters. The wage and price stickiness parameters are set to 0:75, implying that a household expects to change their wage and …rms expect to change their prices once a year. We use the standard Taylor rule parameters for the parameters in the monetary policy function. The central bank places a weight of 0:5 on the output gap and 1:5 on the in ‡ation rate.
The next three parameters in the table are the central bank's in ‡ation target, and the public's perception of the central bank's in ‡ation target. We assume that the central bank targets an annual in ‡ation rate of 5%. The public doesn't know this, and believes that the annual in ‡ation target drifts between 0% and 10%. Note that this combination of real and perceived in ‡ation targets determines that the steady state level of central bank credibility, c = 0:5.
The last two parameters in the table j L 0 and j H 0 are the …rst derivatives of the p.d.f.'s of in ‡ation distributed around the two targets, L and H . These parameters are the slope of the two distribution functions in …gure 1, evaluated at the steady state level of in ‡ation, the central bank's true in ‡ation target . As can be seen from updating equation for c t in equation (6) and the accompanying footnote in the text, the value of these two …rst derivatives, evaluated at the steady state in ‡ation rate , are all that we need for a linearization of the updating equation in (6). The value of these two …rst derivatives are found by calculating the p.d.f.'s of the distribution of in ‡ation around the two target values and assuming that the standard deviation of in ‡ation around these two targets is 0:7%, which approximately the standard deviation of in ‡ation in the benchmark version of the model without endogenous credibility. As show by the updating function for c t , the central bank's stock of credibility will eventually return to c. The central bank's actual in ‡ation target = c L + (1 c) H , and thus while agents may believe the target is~ t = c t L + (1 c t ) H , with enough timẽ t ! and agents form expectations around the true target, but in the short to medium term~ t 6 = . The e¤ect that a series of in ‡ation surprises can have on agent's perceptions of c t and thus~ t , or alternatively the rate at which c t returns to c, and thus~ t returns to depends on the parameter , which measures the "anchoring" of in ‡ation expectations.
In the version of the model where central bank credibility is …xed, = 0. In the version of the model with endogenous credibility, we can calibrate the model such that the model can match the observed movement in long-run in ‡ation expectations to unexpected in ‡ation.
As discussed earlier, the Cleveland Fed calculates n year ahead in ‡ation expectations for n = 1:::30 for the U.S. at a monthly frequency. From the 5 and 10 year ahead in ‡ation expectations at time t we can calculate 5 year-5 year forward in ‡ation expectations at time t, which is the average of the monthly in ‡ation rates that we expect to observe between 5 years from now and 10 years from now, E t 1 5 10 P i=6 t+i . Similarly we can use the 6 and 11 year ahead expectations at time t 1 to calculate 6 year-5 year forward in ‡ation expectation at time t 1, E t 1 1 5 11 P i=7 t 1+i , which by the law of iterative expectations is the expectation taken at time t 1 of the 5 year-5 year forward in ‡ation expectation at time
Similarly, the Cleveland Fed calculates the 1 year ahead expected in ‡ation rate. E t 1 ( t ) is the one year ahead in ‡ation expectation taken last year. Subtract that from the current realized in ‡ation rate to …nd unexpected in ‡ation over the previous year, t E t 1 ( t ).
A simple OLS regression is used to calculate by how much to agents update their long-run in ‡ation expectations in response to unexpected in ‡ation:
From this regression, if actual in ‡ation in period t is 1 percentage point higher than expected the previous year, then agents increase their expectations of in ‡ation between 5 and 10 years from now by percentage points. Using monthly data, we run this regression over three time periods, from 1982-1989, from 1990-1999, and from 2000-2007 . The estimated 's are presented in table 4. The table shows that in the 1980's, when in ‡ation was 100 basis points above what was expected the previous year, people would raise their 5 year-5 year in ‡ation expectations by 27 basis points. In the 2000's, the same 100 basis point unexpected in ‡ation would only lead to an 8 basis point increase in long-run in ‡ation expectations. Between the 1980's and the 2000's, long-run in ‡ation expectations had become better anchored and thus current in ‡ation had less of an in ‡uence on long-run in ‡ation expectations.
The parameter that measures the responsiveness of central bank credibility to innovations to current in ‡ation is set such that when the parameter is calculated from simulations of the model, in the model with endogenous central bank credibility, = 0:279.
Shock Processes
In the next section, we will examine the responses of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations to both productivity and government spending shocks. For simplicity, we only consider the e¤ect of one shock at a time, and we assume that each shock follows an AR(1) process with an autoregressive coe¢ cient of 0:9. In one alternative version in the next section we will consider the case where the shock is nearly permanent with an autoregressive coe¢ cient of 0:9999.
Since the model is solved with a …rst-order approximation around the steady state, and only one shock is active at any time, the variance of the shock doesn't matter for most of the dynamics in the model. To ease the comparison between the model and the data, the variance of each shock is calibrated so that the standard deviation of in ‡ation in the model with endogenous credibility is 1:357%, which the same as that in the U.S. during the 1980's as seen in table 1.
Results
To access the e¤ect of endogenous central bank credibility, we will present the results from the model in two steps. First, with impulse responses, we will chart the path of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations following a productivity or government spending shock. Here we will not only compare the model with endogenous credibility to the model with …xed central bank credibility, but we will consider additional features of the New Keynesian model that researchers have used to increase the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations; we will compare the model with endogenous credibility to a version of the model with …xed credibility but with price and wage indexation, or a version of the model with …xed credibility but a highly persistent shock process. Then with simulations of the model we will calculate the same statistics that are presented in tables 1 and 2 and see how only the model with endogenous credibility can replicate the features observed in the data like the volatility of long-run in ‡ation expectations or the high correlation between current in ‡ation and long-run in ‡ation expectations.
Impulse responses
The responses of current in ‡ation, 1 year ahead in ‡ation expectations, 10 year ahead expectations, and 5 year-5 year forward expectations to a negative TFP shock are presented in …gure 2.
First, let us compare the impulse responses in the model with endogenous credibility to those from the benchmark model with …xed credibility. Following the negative TFP shock, current in ‡ation jumps about 20 basis points in both models. However, in the benchmark model with …xed credibility, in ‡ation quickly returns to its steady state level, but in the model with endogenous credibility, in ‡ation is much more persistent.
The persistence of in ‡ation in the endogenous credibility model can also be seen in the responses of in ‡ation expectations. One year ahead in ‡ation expectations initially jump by about 10 basis points in both models, but in the model with …xed credibility they quickly return to the steady state. When credibility is …xed, long-run measures of in ‡ation expectations barely move following the shock, but when credibility is endogenous these longrun measures react positively following a positive shock to current in ‡ation and are quite persistent.
Thus endogenous central bank credibility leads to greater volatility and persistence in both in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations. In models with …xed central bank credibility, researchers have used either price and wage indexation or a very persistence forcing process to help the model match observed levels of in ‡ation persistence.
8 Figure 2 also plots impulse responses for the version of the model with …xed credibility but full price and wage indexation, and the version of the model with …xed credibility but where the persistence of shock to TFP is set to 0:9999. Both additional features of the model lead to greater in ‡ation volatility and persistence than in the benchmark version of the model with …xed credibility. Current in ‡ation is slightly more volatile and persistent in the model with endogenous credibility than it is in the model with the near permanent forcing process, but in ‡ation is less volatile in the model with endogenous credibility than it is with …xed credibility but full price and wage indexation.
Following the TFP shock, current in ‡ation jumps by about 20 basis points in the version of the model with endogenous credibility, but it jumps nearly 35 basis points in the model with full price and wage indexation.
However, with …xed credibility, the shock to in ‡ation quickly dissipates and despite the fact that initially in ‡ation was so much greater in the model with full indexation, after about 30 quarters, in ‡ation in the model with endogenous credibility is higher. Since the initial response of in ‡ation is greater under full indexation than under endogenous credibility, the initial response of 1 year ahead expectations is also greater under full indexation. This result is even true for 10 year ahead expectations. However, since in ‡ation is more persistent in the model with endogenous credibility than in the model with full indexation, the response of the 5 year-5 year forward expectation is much greater in the model with endogenous credibility.
The responses of the same four variables to a government spending shock are presented in …gure 3. The same pattern continues to hold under demand shocks as under supply shocks. In ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations are far more volatile and persistent in the model with endogenous credibility than they are in the benchmark version of the model with …xed credibility. In addition, versions of the model with …xed credibility but either full indexation or near permanent shocks can produce more volatile in ‡ation responses in the short run, but in ‡ation is far more persistent under endogenous central bank credibility, and thus only under endogenous credibility is there much response in the long-run measures of in ‡ation expectation like the 5 year-5 year forward expectation.
Moments from model simulations
The volatility and persistence of current and expected in ‡ation taken from simulations of the model under productivity shocks is presented in table 5. The table presents simulated moments from four versions of the model. The version of the model with endogenous credibility, the version of the model with full price and wage indexation, the version of the model where the exogenous productivity shock follows close to a unit root process, and the benchmark version of the model with …xed credibility, no price and wage indexation, and non-permanent productivity shocks.
The table is meant to compare the model with endogenous credibility with the other modi…cations of the New Keynesian model authors have proposed to raise persistence of in ‡ation. First, from the table it is clear that all three modi…cations, endogenous credibility, indexation, and permanent shocks, increase the persistence of in ‡ation over the benchmark New Keynesian model. These three modi…cations also raise the relative volatility of one year ahead in ‡ation expectations, and they improve the model's ability to match the posi-tive co-movement between current in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations (particularly long-run in ‡ation expectations).
However, the model with price and wage indexation or permanent shocks fail to match the relative volatility of long-run in ‡ation expectations. As is shown in table 1, in the United States in the 1980's long-run in ‡ation expectations, either the 10 year ahead expected in ‡ation rate or the 5 year-5 year forward expected in ‡ation rate are around half as volatile as current in ‡ation. In the benchmark New Keynesian model they are around a tenth as volatile as current in ‡ation. Adding intrinsic or inherited in ‡ation persistence does go some way towards explaining the volatility of 10 year ahead expectations, but these two modi…cations fail to raise the relative volatility of the 5 year -5 year forward expected in ‡ation rate. Introducing price and wage indexation actually leads to a fall in the relative volatility of the 5 year-5 year forward rate. Only the model with endogenous credibility, parameterized to match the level of central bank credibility observed in the United States in the 1980's, can produce the relative volatility of long-run expected in ‡ation rates observed in the United States in the 1980's. Table 6 presents the same model simulation results, only now the model is driven by government spending shocks instead of productivity shocks. The results are broadly similar, with a few exceptions. The most notable is that the versions of the model with endogenous credibility or price and wage indexation increase the persistence of in ‡ation over the benchmark New Keynesian model, but the version of the model with near permanent shocks, does not. Also, the versions of the model with endogenous credibility and indexation lead to an improvement in the model's ability to match the high positive co-movement between current in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations, particularly long-run in ‡ation expectations, the model with near permanent government spending shocks cannot replicate the high and positive co-movement.
However, just as in the case where the model is driven by productivity shocks, only the version of the model with endogenous credibility can replicate the volatility of long-run in ‡ation expectations. Just as before, the versions of the model with indexation or near permanent shocks bring a slight improvement in the ability of the New Keynesian model to match the relative volatility of 10 year ahead in ‡ation expectations, but do not begin to explain the volatility of the 5 year-5 year forward rate. Table 7 presents the moments that describe the behavior of in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations in the United States during the 1980's and the 2000's, and it also presents the results from simulations of the model under both productivity shocks and government spending shocks where the model is calibrated to match the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations, described by the parameter from table 4 during the 1980's and the 2000's. The …rst three columns in the table present the U.S. data and the percent change in the data from the 1980's to the 2000's. The second set of three columns present the results from simulations of the model under productivity shocks. The …rst two columns in the middle section present the results from the model where parameter in equation (6) is calibrated to match the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations described by the parameter, as seen in the last row of the table. The third set of three columns present the same results but in the model where business cycles are driven by government spending shocks.
Comparing changes in credibility
Thus table 7 is meant to show whether or not the observed changes in U.S. in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations from the 1980's to today can be explained by changes in central bank credibility, holding all else constant.
The …rst thing to notice is that the model, particularly the model with productivity shocks, can explain nearly all of the fall in U.S. in ‡ation volatility from the 1980's to today. In the data, U.S. in ‡ation volatility fell by 38% over this period, in the model with productivity shocks, changes in central bank credibility, holding all else …xed, led to a 30% fall in in ‡ation volatility. Under government spending shocks the change in volatility is not quite as large, but the observed change in credibility will still lead to a 13% fall in in ‡ation volatility.
The change in credibility can also explain the fall in the relative volatility of various measures of expected in ‡ation. In the data, the relative volatility of one year ahead in ‡ation expectations fell by about 10% and that for long-run expectations fell by 30%. The model with productivity shocks actually over-predicts this fall in relative volatility and predicts that the relative volatility of one year ahead expectations should fall by about 20% and the volatility of long-run expectations should fall by 60-80%. The model with government spending shocks is nearly perfect in predicting that the observed changes in central bank credibility along should lead to a 30% fall in the relative volatility of long-run measures of in ‡ation expectations.
The models do a relatively poor job in explaining the fall in the contemporaneous correlation between current in ‡ation and the various measures of in ‡ation expectations. However, improvements in central bank credibility can explain the observed fall in the correlation between in ‡ation expectations and the one period lag of current in ‡ation. In the data, this correlation fell by nearly a third when considering one year ahead expectation and by over half when considering long-run measures of expectations. In the model with productivity shocks, changes in the central bank credibility parameter, holding all else constant, also predict about a 50% fall in the correlation between measures of expected in ‡ation and the lagged in ‡ation rate.
Finally, a change in the level of central bank credibility in the model can explain nearly all of the change in the persistence of in ‡ation and various measures of expected in ‡ation from the 1980's to today. The one period autocorrelation of current in ‡ation has fallen by about 11% over this time. Improvements in central bank credibility alone show that this autocorrelation should fall by about 8%. Similarly, the model nearly matches the observed changes in the persistence of long-run measures of in ‡ation expectations.
Summary and conclusion
This paper provides a mechanism through which past observations of in ‡ation can in ‡uence the public's perception of the central bank and thus can in ‡uence in ‡ation expectations into the future. This paper shows how this mechanism can lead to an increase in the volatility and persistence of both in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations in the benchmark New Keynesian model. Other features added to the standard New Keynesian model, like price and wage indexation, can improve on the model's ability to explain the volatility and persistence of current in ‡ation and short-run in ‡ation expectations, but only the model with endogenous credibility can match the volatility of long-run in ‡ation expectations that we see in the data. This concept of endogenous central bank credibility gives rise to two interesting directions for further research. The …rst is in an open economy. As described in the …rst paragraph of the introduction, when Milton Friedman said that "in ‡ation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon", he was careful to qualify that in ‡ation is a sustained increase in the general price level. Exogenous shocks, like an increase in commodity prices, could lead to a transitory increase in the price level, but a sustained increase over the long run must be driven by monetary policy, or at least the public's perception of monetary policy.
Thus an interesting extension of this endogenous credibility model to an open economy would be to consider how foreign shocks that cause a transitory increase in in ‡ation might a¤ect the public's belief about the credibility of the central bank, and then that change in credibility would a¤ect expectations and price setting by domestic agents into the future. Thus the transitory increase in prices due to the foreign shock could have a long lasting e¤ect on domestic in ‡ation.
The second, and closely related direction for further research, relates to the optimal conduct of monetary policy when the central bank's stock of credibility is endogenous. Orphanides and Williams (2004; and Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2006; present models where agents'have imperfect information about the parameters in the central bank's policy rule function, or where they are unsure if a shock to in ‡ation is transitory or permanent. These models all show that in this environment, the central bank should be more aggressive when responding to changes in in ‡ation. The mechanism in this model with endogenous credibility is very similar to the mechanism in a learning model, only the interpretation is di¤erent. Posen (2011) argues that the central bank's reaction to a transitory increase in prices should depend on how well anchored are in ‡ation expectations. If the central bank's stock of credibility is very sensitive to the observed in ‡ation rate (in terms of the model, a high parameter) then then central bank will want to be very aggressive in responding to transitory increases in in ‡ation, but as expectations become better anchored and the stock of central bank credibility is less responsive to the observed in ‡ation rate (a lower parameter) then the central bank may not want to be as aggressive in responding to transitory movements in prices. Thus an interesting direction for further research would be to quantify how the central bank's optimal monetary policy depends on this "anchoring" of in ‡ation expectations.
A Technical Appendix -Not for publication
This appendix will present some of the more technical derivations in the paper related to the nominal rigidities present in the model. The …rst section in the appendix will solve for the household's optimal wage and present the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) for wage in ‡ation. The second section will solve for the …rm's optimal price and present the derivation of the NKPC for core in ‡ation.
A.1 Sticky Wages
In any given period, household j faces a probability of 1 w of being able to reset their wage.
If household j is allowed to reset their wages in period t they will set a wage to maximize the expected present value of utility from consumption minus the disutility of labor.
where t+ is the marginal utility of consumption in period t + .
9
The imperfect combination of labor from di¤erent households is described in (12). Use this function to derive the demand function for labor from a speci…c household:
where
is the average wage across households, and H t is aggregate labor supplied by all households.
Substitute the labor demand function into the maximization problem to express the maximization problem as a function of one choice variable, the wage rate, W t (l):
9 We assume complete contingent claims markets among households within a country. This implies that the marginal utility of consumption is the same across all households within a country, regardless of their income. Therefore the total utility from the consumption of labor income in any period is simply the country speci…c marginal utility of comsumption, t , multiplied by the household's labor income, W t (l) N t (l).
After some rearranging, the …rst order condition of this problem is: If wages are ‡exible, and thus w = 0, this expression reduces to:
Thus when wages are ‡exible the wage rate is equal to a mark-up, ( 1) , multiplied by the marginal disutility of labor,
H , divided by the marginal utility of consumption, t .
Write the wage rate for the household that can reset wages in period t, W t (l), as W t (l)
to denote it as an optimal wage. Also note that all households that can reset wages in period t will reset to the same wage rate, so W t (l) = W t .
All households face a probability of (1 w ) of being able to reset their wages in a given period, so by the law of large numbers (1 w ) of households can reset their wages in a given period. The wages of the other w will automatically reset by the previous periods in ‡ation rate.
So substitute W t into the expression for the average wage rate
, to derive an expression for the evolution of the average wage:
The …rm that can reset prices in period t will choose P t (i) to maximize discounted future pro…ts:
where M C t+ is marginal cost of production in period t + .
The demand function faced by the …rm is given in (??). Substitute this demand function into the maximization problem to express this problem as a function of one choice variable,
After some rearranging, the …rst order condition with respect to P t (i) is:
Write the price set by the …rm that can reset prices in period t as P t (i) to denote that it is an optimal price. Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same level, so P t (i) = P t . Substitute this optimal price into the price index
and use the fact that in any period 1 p percent of …rms will reoptimize prices to derive an expression for the price index, P t :
In 
